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Abstract
With the U.S. government acknowledgement of the seriousness of cyber
threats, particularly against its critical infrastructures, as well as the
Department of Defense officially labeling cyberspace as a war fighting
domain, the Cold War strategy of deterrence is being applied to the cyber
domain. However, unlike the nuclear realm, cyber deterrence must
incorporate a wide spectrum of potential adversaries of various skill,
determination, and capability, ranging from individual actors to state run
enterprises. What’s more, the very principles that achieved success in
deterring the launch of nuclear weapons during the Cold War, namely the
threat of severe retaliation, cannot be achieved in cyberspace, thus
neutralizing the potential effectiveness of leveraging a similar strategy.
Attribution challenges, the ability to respond quickly and effectively, and
the ability to sustain a model of repeatability prove to be insurmountable
in a domain where actors operate in obfuscation.
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Introduction 
With the U.S. government (USG) acknowledgement of the seriousness of cyber threats, 
particularly against its critical infrastructures, as well as the Department of Defense (DoD) 
officially labeling cyberspace as a war fighting domain, security experts, policymakers, and think 
tank researchers have resurrected a potential Cold War strategy to implement against the new 
threats fermenting in cyberspace.1 It is argued that the same principles that successfully 
contributed to nuclear deterrence with the Soviet Union can be applied to cyberspace and the 
hostile actors that operate within. However compelling, similar strategies are not transferrable 
and the key factors that made nuclear deterrence a viable solution does not carry the same value 
in cyberspace. While only a handful of states have demonstrated the capability to develop 
nuclear weapons, more than 140 nations have or are developing cyber weapons, and more than 
thirty countries are creating military cyber units, according to some estimates. Moreover, this 
threat actor landscape does not consist of nation states alone. Included are cyber criminals, 
hackers, and hacktivists of varying levels of sophistication and resources willing to use their 
capabilities to support nefarious objectives.2  
 
There are advocates favoring the implementation of a cyber deterrence strategy to mitigate the 
volume of hostile cyber activity against public and private sector interests. However, too many 
factors—including attribution challenges and sustainability against this vast threat actor 
landscape—inhibit cyber deterrence options from achieving their desired outcome in the near 
term. What’s more, other deterrent strategies such as those employed against nuclear weapon 
use, terrorism, and rogue state behavior is not suitable models for the cyber realm. Despite some 
commonalities, the cyber domain lacks the transparency and actor visibility required to develop 
deterrence measures. Despite these hindrances, nation states should seek to develop, refine, and 
implement national level cyber security strategies that focus on cyber defense improvements and 
enforce accountability to measure their successes. While there will always be sophisticated 
actors able to thwart the most robust cyber security defenses, the success of hostile activity 
against networks are the result of poor cyber security practices such as unpatched systems and 
users not well trained in information assurance principles. Cyber security is an ongoing effort 
that needs to be relentlessly monitored and adapted to a constantly changing threat environment. 
 
What is Cyber Deterrence? 
Before one embraces the design and development of a nation state cyber deterrent strategy, it is 
important to understand the basic concepts of deterrence and what it entails for a strategy of 
cyber deterrence. At its base, a deterrence strategy seeks to influence an adversary from not 
                                                     
1
 “International Strategy for Cyberspace,” The White House, May 2011, available at: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/international_strategy_for_cyberspace.pdf; “Department of 
Defense’s Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace,” U.S. Department of Defense, July 2011, available at: 
http://www.defense.gov/news/d20110714cyber.pdf. 
2
 “Nuclear Weapons: Who Has Them At a Glance,” Arms Control Association, April 2013, available at: 
http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Nuclearweaponswhohaswhat; Susan W. Brenner and Leo L. Clarke, 
“Civilians in Cyberwarfare: Casualties,” SMU Science & Technology Law Review 13 (2010): 249; Graham H. Todd, 
“Armed Attack in Cyberspace: Deterring Asymmetric Warfare with an Asymmetric Definition,” Air Force Law 
Review 64 rev 96 (2009); William J. Lynn, III, “The Pentagon’s Cyberstrategy, One Year Later: Defending Against 
the Next Cyberattack,” Foreign Affairs (September 28, 2011), available at: 
www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68305/william-j-lynn-iii/the-pentagons-cyberstrategy-one-year-later. 
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attacking a target by making him believe the costs and consequences will outweigh any potential 
benefits. Therefore, a working definition by the author and perhaps more importantly what it 
involves and its intended effects may sound something like this: 
 
“Cyber deterrence is a strategy by which a defending state seeks to maintain the status 
quo by signaling its intentions to deter hostile cyber activity by targeting and influencing 
an adversary’s decision making apparatus to avoid engaging in destructive cyber activity 
for fear of a greater reprisal by the initial aggressor.” 
 
With this baseline understanding, it is equally essential to identify the types of deterrence that are 
available and have been used throughout the course of history. Although there are a myriad 
iterations and subsets, there are largely two types of deterrence strategies employed by the 
United States—deterrence by punishment and deterrence by denial. 
 
• Deterrence by punishment intimates to an attacker that there will be significant 
punishment in retaliation for an attack.3 In this scenario, retaliation need not be limited to 
specific actions, but can incorporate other means as well, such as kinetic strikes or more 
diplomatic means such as economic sanctions.4 An example of deterrence by punishment 
is the Cold War’s mutually assured destruction doctrine wherein the threat of using a 
nuclear weapon prevented an adversary from using a similar weapon. 
 
Applying the same principle to cyberspace, deterrence by punishment can take the form 
of digital actions such as a retaliatory cyber strike against perpetrators of a cyber attack, 
or a pre-emptive strike against adversary’s mounting an attack against networks. 
However, deterrence by punishment against a cyber attack could also entail kinetic 
attacks against targets, diplomatic bargaining, or economic sanctions. If one believes that 
the United States was behind the STUXNET attack that targeted Iranian nuclear 
centrifuges, this could be perceived as a pre-emptive deterrence by punishment against 
Iran for continuing to refine its uranium enrichment procedures. 
 
• Deterrence by denial is less conflict driven, seeking to convince potential attackers that 
their effort will not succeed and they will be denied the benefits they seek.5 The benefit 
of this strategy is that it may be based on defensive measures and thus not only be a 
means of preventing the enemy from acting but also providing a solution in case the 
challenger decides to act.6 An example of this type of deterrence is the U.S. naval 
blockade around Cuba in 1962. In this instance, the United States opted to deny entry to 
Russian ships from entering Cuban waters rather than deploying air strikes against Cuban 
missile sites.  
 
                                                     
3 Jeffrey W. Knopf, “Use With Caution: The Value and Limits of Deterrence Against Asymmetric Threats,” World 
Politics Review (June 11, 2013), available at: http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/13006/use-with-caution-
the-value-and-limits-of-deterrence-against-asymmetric-threats. 
4 Amir Lupovici, “Cyber Warfare and Deterrence: Trends and Challenges in Research,” Military and Strategic 
Affairs 3:3 (December 2011): 54. 
5
 Knopf, “Use With Caution: The Value and Limits of Deterrence Against Asymmetric Threats.”  
6
 Lupovici, “Cyber Warfare and Deterrence: Trends and Challenges in Research,” 54. 
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In cyberspace, deterrence by denial assumes a more traditional defensive role by 
discouraging or frustrating attacks via robust, proactive, and costly defenses. It requires a 
large, focused commitment by the government to secure the systems and networks under 
its control, in tandem with the full cooperation of the private owners of the 
infrastructure.7 The cost increases significantly given the breadth of this endeavor 
including the use of advanced security practices and the adoption of trusted hardware and 
software components.8 
 
Necessary Factors for Effective Cyber Deterrence 
Cyber deterrence is difficult to execute, as there are several factors that must occur in order to 
achieve the results of either subset of deterrence strategy. A cyber deterrence strategy must have 
established parameters from which to operate successfully. Without them, an adversary will not 
be able to receive and process the defender’s intent, which runs the risks of misunderstanding or 
misinterpreting them, thereby increasing the risk of escalation and quite possibly, that of state on 
state confrontation. 
 
Communication 
Part of any deterrence strategy is to be able to effectively communicate to the international 
community, and particularly adversaries, on what is acceptable and what are redlines that will be 
addressed if crossed. In Arms and Influence, author Thomas Schelling notes that successful 
deterrence using either punishment or denial methods depends upon effective communication 
between a state and the entity it wishes to deter.9 Working in tandem with communication is the 
notion of credibility. A nation state must not just pronounce activity it considers crossing 
redlines, but must be prepared to act as a result of that activity. A nation state risks losing its 
international credibility when it fails to do this. An example of this occurred in 2012 when 
President Barack Obama proclaimed that any use of chemical weapons by the Syrian 
government against its citizenry would result in a crossed redline.10 However, once intelligence 
confirmed that chemical weapons had been used six months later, Obama still had not acted to 
back up his public assertion.11 By refusing to back up his bold statement, the United States lost 
some of its credibility. Even after it agreed to supply the Syrian rebels with arms in July 2013, 
many in the international community viewed this as “too little too late.”12 
 
In cyberspace, communication assumes an important function given that the domain is one 
steeped in ambiguity. Effective communication would require a consensus for operating norms 
of behavior in cyberspace, a difficult endeavor to achieve as evidenced when the United States 
and China failed to identify common language in the July 2013 Strategic and Economic 
                                                     
7
 David Elliott, “Deterring Strategic Cyberattack,” IEEE Security & Privacy 9:5 (September/October 2011): 36-40. 
8
 W.K. Clark and P.L. Levin, “Securing the Information Highway,” Foreign Affairs, Nov./Dec. 2009: 2-10. 
9
 Jonathan Solomon, “Cybercdeterrence between Nation States: Plausible Strategy or Pipe Dream?” Strategic 
Studies Quarterly (Spring 2011): 2. 
10
 “Obama Warns Al-Asad Against Chemical Weapons, Declares ‘World is Watching,’” CNN Online, December 3, 
2012, available at: http://www.cnn.com/2012/12/03/world/meast/syria-civil-war. 
11
 Terrence Burlij and Christina Bellantoni, “Syria Crossed Obama’s Redline. What Happens Next?” PBS Online, 
June 14, 2013, available at: http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/2013/06/administration-sharpens-focus-on-
syria-with-chemical-weapons-report.html. 
12
 “Few Satisfied, But U.S. Presses Syrian Arms Effort,” Las Vegas Sun Online, July 26, 2013, available at: 
http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2013/jul/26/us-obama-aid-to-syria/. 
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Dialogue.13 The United States prefers to use the term “cyber security” to focus on the 
technologies and networks of automated machines, whereas countries like China and Russia 
prefer to use the broader term “information security” to include the information resident on or 
passing through networks as well as the technologies themselves.14 The key to this discrepancy 
rests in the activities that occur in cyberspace; China is pursuing a broader interpretation to be 
able to dictate and control the content and information to which its citizenry has access, whereas 
the U.S. supports the policy of Internet freedom. As of the second December 2013 meeting of the 
China - U.S. Cybersecurity Working Group, the two countries remain at an impasse in finding 
common ground on definition language. Without a common lexicon in place, communication 
between the two sides is fated to remain in disagreement, failing to achieve consensus on how 
the Internet should be used appropriately. Similarly, when addressing hostile activities in 
cyberspace where the actors are foreign to each other, the inability to communicate further 
impedes the ability to send clear messages and deescalate tensions. The 2001 Council of Europe-
led Convention on Cybercrime provides a good framework from which agreed upon terminology 
can be achieved. The agreement successfully identifies key terminology agreed upon by all 
signatories. To date, there have been forty-one ratifications/accessions to the Convention. 
Notably, while listed as a non-member state, Russia has yet to sign or ratify the agreement, and 
China has not joined indicating their reluctance to accept terminology agreed to by Western 
States.15 
 
Signaling 
Signaling game logic has been applied to many areas of international politics in the past decade, 
including decisions to go to war, crisis bargaining, international economic negotiations, regional 
integration, and foreign policies of democratic states.16 Whether in peacetime or war, a key 
element of any cyber deterrence strategy includes the ability to properly signal intentions to the 
receiver. Without the ability to signal, cyber deterrence by punishment is rendered ineffective 
and runs the risk of being misunderstood or misinterpreted, increasing the risk of escalation and 
conflict. For example, prior to the execution of deterrence by punishment, the defending state 
must clearly signal its discontent to the aggressor (whether a nation state or non-state actor) in 
such a way that the aggressor interprets it correctly, understands it, and concludes that the 
potential costs of undertaking such action far outweigh any potential benefits. However, it should 
be noted that the signaling nation state must have an established body of work and credibility 
conducting successful and destructive cyber retaliation for signaling to be effective. If the 
adversary does not believe the credibility of a signaling nation state or if it flat out does not care, 
it is immaterial how much signaling is completed. In this case, the aggressor will not be deterred 
by threat of punishment.  
 
Like communication, signaling in cyberspace can be easily misinterpreted, ignored, or not even 
noticed by the aggressor. Signaling can be done overtly, covertly, or through diplomatic, 
                                                     
13
 Bill Gertz, “U.S., China Strategic and Economic Dialogue Criticized,” Washington Free Beacon, July 16, 2013, 
available at: http://freebeacon.com/u-s-china-conclude-strategic-and-economic-dialogue-talks/. 
14
 Tim Farnsworth, “China and Russia Submit Cyber Proposal,” Arms Control Association, November 2011, 
available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2011_11/China_and_Russia_Submit_Cyber_Proposal. 
15
 “Convention on Cybercrime,” Council of Europe, CETS No. 185, November 25, 2013, available at: 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=185&CL=ENG. 
16
 James Igoe Walsh, “Do States Play Signaling Games?” Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic 
International Studies Association 42:4 (2007): 441. 
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 7, No. 1
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol7/iss1/6
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.7.1.5
58 
 
economic, or military channels. Take for example the STUXNET incident. If the United States 
government were responsible for the deployment of STUXNET on Iranian centrifuges, the USG 
may have signaled to the Iranian government through diplomatic channels that such an action— 
without revealing the intended target—would transpire if Iran did not cease its enrichment 
process. Thus, when the centrifuges broke down and were replaced, it would have been clear that 
United States was behind the event. Another example of potential signaling in cyberspace would 
be the use of distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks. Continuing with the STUXNET 
scenario, U.S. banks were targeted by DDoS attacks shortly after the discovery of STUXNET. 
Many U.S. lawmakers immediately suspected the Iranian government to having conducted or 
orchestrated the attacks via proxies.17 If Iran was responsible, prior signaling through diplomatic 
or third party channels without revealing specific targets would have clearly conveyed to the 
USG that Iran was not only responding to the STUXNET attack, but also that it had a cyber 
capability to do so as well. 
 
Attribution 
It is extremely difficult to determine attribution in cyberspace where savvy operators have a 
multitude of obfuscation techniques to thwart defenders from correctly identifying their true 
point of origin. Whether it’s compromising a series of computers in different countries prior to 
executing attacks, or using anonymizers and proxies, cyberspace is an environment favoring 
those seeking to conduct surreptitious malicious acts. Attribution is a necessary component of 
any deterrence strategy as it is incumbent on the defending state to positively attribute an 
aggressor prior to the commencement of any retaliatory action. However, complete attribution 
may not be needed to engage in deterrence by denial where other forms of non-destructive 
actions can be directed against an aggressor. Jason Healey of the Atlantic Council presents a 
strong case for determining the “spectrum of state responsibility,” a tool designed to help 
analysts with imperfect knowledge assign responsibility for a particular attack, or campaign of 
attacks, with more precision and transparency.18 The spectrum assigns ten categories, each 
marked by a different degree of responsibility, based on whether a nation ignores, abets, or 
conducts an attack.19 The level of attributed nation state culpability would serve as the guide for 
the type and appropriate level of response ranging from ignoring the initial attack or striking 
back at the perceived aggressor. 
 
Successful attribution practices in cyberspace will ideally meld technical, cognitive, and 
behavioral analysis to better identify the aggressors, as well as those influences that may be 
helping to guide their operations. Technical analysis is not sufficient for attribution purposes, 
considering many hostile actors implement the same tactics, techniques, and procedures, as well 
as tools, or engage in “false flag” operations in conducting malicious activity.20 No standard 
                                                     
17
 Ellen Nakashima, “Iran Blamed for Cyberattacks on U.S. Banks and Companies,” The Washington Post, 
September 21, 2012, available at: http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-09-21/world/35497878_1_web-sites-
quds-force-cyberattacks. 
18
 Jason Healey, “Beyond Attribution: Seeking National Responsibility for Cyber Attacks,” Atlantic Council, 
January 2012, available at: 
http://www.acus.org/files/publication_pdfs/403/022212_ACUS_NatlResponsibilityCyber.PDF. 
19
 Healey, “Beyond Attribution: Seeking National Responsibility for Cyber Attacks.” 
20
 Kelly Jackson Higgins, “The Intersection Between Cyberespionage and Cybercrime,” Dark Reading, June 21, 
2012, available at: http://www.darkreading.com/attacks-breaches/the-intersection-between-
cyberespionage/240002514; Kelly Jackson Higgins, “Attackers Engage in False Flag Attack Manipulation,” Dark 
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methodology exists today for establishing a degree of confidence in determining cyber-
attribution.21 When it comes to possibly deploying a cyber deterrence by punishment, the 
defender must be able to identify the perpetrator for an appropriate response action. Several 
problems inhibit quick and accurate attribution processes including: misattribution; the time it 
takes to collect and analyze the attack method employed; and identifying actor motive, behavior, 
and outside influences. Nevertheless, in order to avoid public embarrassment and reduce the 
volume and likelihood of collateral damage, an acceptable level of attribution must be performed 
prior to the commencement of any retaliatory action. 
 
Proportionality 
Based on the 1949 Geneva Conventions on the Law of Armed Conflict and the principles of 
proportionality, as well as those expressed in NATO’s recent drafting of the Tallinn Manual 
advocating cyber war’s assimilation into conventional warfare, a retaliatory cyber action needs to 
be proportional, particularly if leveled against a suspected state or state-sponsored actor. That is, 
“it must be comparable to the initial wrong and not equate to an escalation.”22 Here, a nation 
state’s credibility is interlinked with proportionality in that the nation state must not only strike 
back against the aggressor but it must do so in a way as to make its point—that is, it must be a 
forceful strike—but not so forceful as to solicit negative reaction in the global community. A 
nation state’s credibility on the world stage rests in its ability to back what it says, and be 
judicious enough to not be perceived as heavy-handed. What is more, it needs to consider 
unintended consequences as a result of cyber retaliation. Take for example the STUXNET worm 
used against Iranian nuclear centrifuges. The malware was written to target specific 
configuration requirements, in this case, the Siemens software resident on the centrifuges. 
However, despite being surreptitiously inserted and deployed on a non-Internet connected 
network, the virus did escape, infecting computers in Azerbaijan, Indonesia, India, Pakistan, and 
the United States.23 Such outcomes can not only prove detrimental to a nation state’s public 
image, but also risk bringing in third party nation states or politically or ideologically motivated 
actors into the conflict (e.g., the hacker attacks against U.S. government websites after the 
accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy in the then Yugoslavia in 1999 and the initiation of 
2001 China - U.S. hacker conflict after the collision of the U.S. spy plane and a Chinese jet).24 
 
Proportionality in cyberspace is difficult to achieve for a variety of reasons. It should reflect the 
commensurate amount of damage done to a target that was suffered by the victim as to mitigate 
the risk of escalation. Perhaps more importantly, a nation state acting independently of a 
respected international organization such as the United Nations mandate, it runs the risk of 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Reading, October 1, 2012, available at: http://www.darkreading.com/attacks-breaches/attackers-engage-in-false-
flag-attack-ma/240008256. 
21
 Emilio Iasiello, “Identifying Cyber-Attackers to Require High-Tech Sleuthing Skills,” National Defense, 
December 2012, available at: 
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2012/December/Pages/IdentifyingCyber-AttackerstoRequireHigh-
TechSleuthingSkills.aspx. 
22
 Eric Talbon Jensen, “Cyber Deterrence,” Emory International Law Review 26:2 (2012): 799.  
23
 “W32.Stuxnet,” Symantec, February 26, 2013, available at: 
http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2010-071400-3123-99. 
24
 Ellen Mesmer, “Kosovo Cyber War Intensifies; Chinese Hackers Targeting U.S. Sites, Government Says,” CNN 
Online, May 12, 1999, available at: http://www.cnn.com/TECH/computing/9905/12/cyberwar.idg/; Craig S. Smith, 
“May 6-12: The First World Hacker War,” The New York Times, May 13, 2001, available at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/05/13/weekinreview/may-6-12-the-first-world-hacker-war.html. 
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diplomatic and even economic blowback for its action. Therefore, prior to retaliation, the type of 
kinetic or non-kinetic response, the promptness of the retaliation, the projected consequences and 
battle damage assessment, and the potential political fallout should all be factored in the decision 
making process. 
 
Other Deterrence Strategies 
There are other deterrent strategies that have achieved mixed levels of success that can be used to 
as potential benchmarks for cyber deterrence. In these cases, while there are some shared 
commonalities such as diverse threat actor landscapes, asymmetric capabilities of defenders and 
aggressors, and military operations, each have their own unique challenges that can’t be 
assimilated to the cyber environment. A brief examination of nuclear, terrorism, and rogue state 
deterrence models will serve as comparative paradigms to see if some of the principles that make 
them successful can be applied to the cyber domain.  
 
Nuclear Deterrence 
There is no greater example of a successful deterrent strategy than that demonstrated by the 
United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. At its core, nuclear deterrence was 
directed at states already armed with nuclear weapons and was aimed at deterring their use.25 By 
the early 1970s, the “mutually assured destruction” theory prevailed; neither the United States 
nor the Soviet Union was motivated, foolish, ignorant, or incoherent to accept the risk of nuclear 
war.26 The results of nuclear deterrence have been a resounding achievement, as no nation state 
since that time has ever deployed a nuclear weapon against a target, as the costs in lives, 
recovery, international prestige, and natural resources have far outweighed any prospective 
benefit to using nuclear weapons in any conflict. 
 
But can the principles involved in nuclear deterrence be applied to cyberspace? Widely viewed 
as an asymmetric power/threat like its nuclear counterpart, the cyber domain is easily translatable 
into a similar paradigm in certain areas. The below Table highlights key similarities shared 
between cyber and nuclear deterrence strategies: 
 
Table 1: Key Similarities Between Cyber and Nuclear Conflict27 
1. Both operate at all three level of military operations: strategic, operational, and tactical, 
with the potential to have effects ranging from small- to population-scale. 
2. Both have the capacity to create large-scale, even existentially, destructive effects. 
3. Both can be conducted between nation-states, between a nation-state and non-state actors, 
or between hybrids involving nation-states and non-state actor proxies. 
4. Both nuclear and cyber conflict “could present the adversary with decisive defeat, 
negating the need to fight conventional wars.” 
5. Both can intentionally or unintentionally cause cascade effects beyond the scope of the 
                                                     
25
 Jeffrey Record, “Nuclear Deterrence, Preventative War, and Counterproliferation,” The Cato Institute 519 (July 
8,2004), available at: http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa519.pdf. 
26
 Keith B. Payne and C. Dale Walton, “Deterrence in the Post-Cold War World,” Strategy in the Contemporary 
World, An Introduction to Strategic Studies, ed. John Baylis, James Wirtz, Eliot Cohen, and Colins. Gray (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2002):169. 
27
 Dr. James C. Mulvenon and Dr. Gregory J. Rattray, “Addressing Cyber Instability: Executive Summary,” The 
Atlantic Council, July 8,2004, available at: http://www.acus.org/files/CCSA_Addressing_Cyber_Instability.pdf. 
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original attack target. 
 
However, despite some crossover, there are too many inconsistencies that prevent an even partial 
adoption of the nuclear deterrence model. These range from the volume of actors operating in 
cyberspace to the comparison of weapon strength to the dual use nature of the tools themselves.  
 
Key differences include: 
• Nation states typically do not assume responsibility for hostile actions taken in cyber 
space. 
• There has been no awe inspiring, game changing show of what a cyber attack can do; 
while incidents like STUXNET and the wiper malware that destroyed 30,000 hard drives 
for the Saudi oil company Saudi Aramco were significant disruptions, they were not 
enough to severely impact operations at either the nuclear facility or the oil company. 
• Attribution in cyberspace is extremely difficult and cannot be as precise as identifying a 
nation state that has launched a nuclear weapon and, 
• Unlike nuclear weapons development, which can be monitored, there is no similar 
transparency for nation state production of cyber weapons, nor an international watchdog 
agency to track such developments.28  
 
Factor in the involvement of proxy groups and third party cutouts, the expanding and borderless 
nature of the operating environment, and the uncertainty that actors can actually be deterred, and 
it is evident that the same fundamental transparencies that have made nuclear deterrence a 
success do not have the same applicability in cyberspace. 
 
Terrorism Deterrence 
Several authors believe that terrorism deterrence can succeed on some level, particularly if a 
terrorist organization assumes the attributes of a nation state, when real assets can be damaged 
influencing terrorist leadership to constrain its policies in order to preserve them.29 One author 
argues that the assassination of top-level leaders and operational commanders have had a 
temporary deterrent effect, if only to provide a lull time in which these groups have had to 
reorganize themselves.30 Another author advocates for deterrence to achieve success against the 
terrorist target, the threatened party must understand the (implicit or explicit) threat, and 
decision-making by the adversary must be sufficiently influenced by calculations of costs and 
benefits.31 Another author states that even if terrorists are generally not deterrable some specific 
terrorist actions may be deterrable even today.32  
 
Nevertheless, there are far more obstacles to, rather than benefits from, deterring terrorism, many 
of which are shared by the cyber domain, particularly when it comes to trying to deter a 
                                                     
28
 Iasiello, Emilio, Cyber Attack: A Dull Tool to Shape Foreign Policy (Tallinn: NATO CCD COE Publications, 
May 2013), 398. 
29
 Shmuel Bar, “Deterring Terrorists,” Hoover Institution, June 2, 2008, available at: 
http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/5674. 
30
 Bar, “Deterring Terrorists.” 
31
 Robert F. Trager and Dessislava P. Zagorcheva, “Deterring Terrorism,” International Security 30:3 (Winter 
2005/2006): 87. 
32
 Davis, Paul K. and Brian Michael Jenkins, Deterrence &Influence in Counterterrorism: A Component in the War 
on Al Qaeda (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp., 2002), 59.  
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perseverant adversary that does not necessarily reside in one or the same location. How does one 
deter the activities of an individual or group without knowing who they are or where they reside?  
 
Another factor complicating deterrence efforts is motivation. While the terrorist leadership may 
value their own lives, groups are full of individuals willing to die for a cause. United Kingdom 
national security scholar John Gearson suggests that traditional concepts of deterrence will not 
work against a terrorist enemy whose avowed tactics are wanton destruction and the targeting of 
innocents; whose so called soldiers seek martyrdom and death and whose most potent protection 
is statelessness.33 Upon closer inspection, the first half of Gearson’s statement is very applicable 
toward hostile cyber actors as well. Actors motivated by a cause, whether political, ideological, 
or financial, are hard pressed to be deterred unless some formative action can cause them 
significant physical, emotional, or financial impact to curb engagement in further hostile activity 
in cyberspace.  
 
Another facet challenging a successful deterrence strategy is consistently influencing terrorist 
behavior. In order to be successful, a direct response deterrent threat must be made conditional 
on an adversary’s behavior; if individuals and political groups believe that they will be targeted 
as part of the U.S. war on terror regardless of their actions, they have less incentive to show 
restraint.34 To date, there have been no publicly observed incidents or evidence where cyber 
deterrence by denial or punishment has been successfully used to mitigate hostile cyber activity, 
or influence the actors directing or conducting the activity. 
 
Rogue States 
The United States also engages in deterrent strategies against those rogue states that pose a threat 
to its national security interests. There are cases to be made on both sides of the equation 
regarding if U.S. policies successfully deter states such as Syria and North Korea. On one hand, 
there has not been a military conflict between the United States and these adversaries suggesting 
current deterrence efforts have been a success. On the other hand, these states continue to pursue 
programs viewed by the U.S. government as hostile regardless of U.S. diplomatic/economic 
efforts to halt their progress. In its second term, the Bush administration announced a new 
approach that it called “tailored deterrence” to be leveraged against these rogue states.35 The 
basis for this line of reasoning was that different strategies could be crafted for different states 
and situations, and that the United States would have to learn what regimes valued most in order 
to develop a deterrent strategy that would most effectively target the psychological profiles of 
their leaders.36 However, there are recent anecdotal examples that illustrate why rogue state 
deterrence is difficult to achieve. 
 
• North Korea: In 2013, North Korea conducted its third nuclear test. In response, the 
United States sent B-52 bombers followed by B-2 stealth bombers on practice flights 
over South Korea. North Korea responded by increased hostile rhetoric and appeared 
prepared to launch a test flight of a new missile. Worried about escalating the situation, 
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the U.S. dialed back its comments and military maneuvers.37 In this instance, deterrent 
military actions did not reduce tensions between the U.S. and North Korea, and even 
risked escalating matters to a military conflict. 
 
• Syria: In August 2012, in response to Syrian rebels attempting to overthrow the Syrian 
regime of Bashar al-Assad, President Barack Obama stated that any use of chemical 
weapons would cross a “red line.” The President bolstered these comments in December 
adding that use of chemical weapons would have “consequences”—bureaucratic-speak 
for potential kinetic or military responses.38 However, when the United States failed to 
act once chemical weapons had been used, the U.S. government lost considerable 
credibility—a necessary component of a deterrent by punishment strategy. 
 
Potential removal from office is not always a deterrent factor when dealing with rogue nation 
states run by authoritarian regimes. What is more, the removal of leaders still has not dissuaded 
other totalitarian leaders from their courses of action. For example, Muammar Gaddafi’s 
besiegement by civil war in 2011 coupled with his ultimate demise with the support of U.S. and 
NATO material and logistical support has done nothing to convince Syria’s al-Assad to step 
down.  
 
Similarly, nation state operators, mercenary groups for hire, hacktivists, or criminals will likely 
be undeterred by law enforcement, intelligence, or military engagement. Cyber criminals 
continue their activities despite several high profile international arrests.39 Suspected nation state 
actors continue to engage in cyber espionage despite being called out in public forums.40 
Operation Ababil hacktivists continue to conduct DDoS against U.S. financial institutions for the 
better part of a year and a half without consequence.41 Ultimately, trying to apply a rogue state 
deterrent strategy against the cyber environment may not be a suitable fit, due to the complexity 
and diversity of the threat actor landscape. Many of these actors do not operate like a rogue state 
whose ultimate purpose is regime stability and preservation of leadership; as such, these actors 
do not cherish the same values. Even suspected nation state actors answer to their chain of 
command and would only stop given the proper instruction from above. 
  
Can Cyber Deterrence Work? 
Martin Libicki states, “The goal of cyber deterrence is to reduce the risk of cyber attacks to an 
acceptable level at an acceptable cost,” where the defending nation state mitigates potential 
offensive action by threatening a potent retaliation.42 But can such a policy actually be 
successful? While it is entirely possible that cyber deterrence will not be executed in a vacuum, 
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in its 2011 Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace, the DoD justified the use of active cyber 
defense measures to prevent intrusions and affect adversary activities on DoD networks and 
systems.43 This responsibility, coupled with the disclosure of the once classified Presidential 
Policy Directive-20 (if this is a legitimate document), indicate that the U.S. can engage in 
offensive cyber activity to curb an imminent threat, or ongoing attack that do not require prior 
Presidential approval, suggesting that deterrent cyber actions may be conducted as an isolated 
effort.44 Therefore, taken in this context, prior to engaging in a retaliatory strike back option, it is 
necessary to make some points clear with regards to cyber deterrence. In no way does advocating 
offensive actions for defensive purposes nullify the need to have an established cyber defense 
posture. As such, some truths remain: 
 
1. Traditional Cyber Defenses Still Need to Be in Place. An argument can be made that a 
successful “deterrence by punishment” policy would greatly reduce expenditures 
associated with traditional cyber security to include devices, programs, and the costs 
associated with upkeep, maintenance, and replacement. However, this is misleading. A 
deterrence strategy cannot address all of cyberspace’s hostile actors. If deterrence is 
meant to dissuade serious actors such as nation states or the more sophisticated cyber 
criminals and hacktivists groups, what will stop the majority of other “noise” that targets 
networks? Jim Lewis, a cyber expert from the Center of Strategic & International Studies, 
states that “survey data consistently shows that 80-90 percent of successful breaches of 
corporate networks required only the most basic techniques, and that 96 percent of those 
could have been avoided if proper security controls were in place.”45 Indeed, the same 
sentiment was expressed when Australia’s Defense Signals Directorate in partnership 
with the U.S. National Security Agency came up with a list of measures that would 
mitigate most of the “successful” attacks they had surveyed in 2009 and 2010.46 Thus, 
even the most basic computer security practices would still be required in order to 
achieve maximum cyber defense coverage. 
 
2. Deterrence by Punishment Relies on the Rationality of Actors. Deterrence is an 
option that will work only if the people/groups/government being deterred are rational; 
and as such, can be deterred because they are unwilling to risk losing something of 
greater value. Currently, adversaries operate in cyberspace because they do not fear 
retaliation due to known attribution challenges, and the connected, nebulous, unsecure 
environment favors their maneuvers. Therefore, a nation state may be more conducive to 
deterrence than a terrorist or hacktivist organization. If the adversary does not hold a 
rational view of the world and his place in it, or he does not have anything to lose or be 
threatened, he may be very difficult to deter from a specific course of action. 
 
3. The Adversary Must Have Something of Value. Building on the previous statement, 
the adversary must have something of value for a pre-emptive/retaliatory strike to be 
effective. If he doesn’t, then the threat of cyber deterrence becomes inconsequential. For 
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example, a nation state likely has many assets linked to the Internet or are at least 
networked. But what if it is a closed state? For example, North Korea has very few online 
assets connected to the Internet that can be targeted remotely (suggesting that any 
effective cyber operation against a high value target would have to be conducted via close 
operations, as was suspected in the STUXNET incident). And if the adversary is a 
cellular-structured terrorist or hacktivist group dispersed globally, what value point can 
be leveraged that will have sway over the actions of the entire group? 
 
With these truths in mind, and upon review of current deterrence strategies against other targets, 
it is evident that cyber deterrence by punishment success rests in three fundamental axioms: 
 
• Attribution. It may seem like common sense, but it is essential for a government to 
know who attacked it before launching any counterattack. But how does one gain 
reasonable confidence in a domain that thrives on ambiguity? There are so many factors 
to consider prior to launching a retaliatory strike including but not limited to: the 
attacker’s identity (If linked to a nation state, did the attacker receive orders from above 
or is he acting alone? If a third party, is it working on behalf of a nation state government 
or just acting to support it? Is it a false flag operation, why or why not?); motivations for 
the attack (What prompted the attack? Was it in itself retaliation for something that the 
targeted nation state did?); and the intention of the attack (Was the intent of the attack to 
destroy, degrade, deny, or disrupt, or something else? Did the attack have an intended 
purpose other than what is being seen on the surface?). Also, some things to consider: if 
the originating attack were viewed as cause-motivated, several states, hackers, or 
hacktivists would have reasons to having conducted the attack. Even if these third parties 
were acting on behalf of the state, do you hold the state or the actors responsible? Who 
exactly is the target – the nation state pulling the strings or the actors conducting the 
attacks? 
 
But is attribution enough? When one looks at the amount of governments that have 
singled out China as the main hacking threat to their nations, little has been done to either 
stop or deter Chinese cyber espionage. President Obama has had several talks with 
Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping that has yet to yield any substantive results.47 While there 
has been no known U.S. attempt at conducting a retaliatory strike (as of yet) against the 
Chinese, this goes to prove that attribution is not a panacea, even when directly 
confronting the alleged perpetrator directly, and that the challenge remains to convince 
the attacker that he has in fact been caught doing something specific.48 
 
• Repeatability. Repeatability across many different threat actors is an important facet of 
cyber deterrence, and one of its biggest questions. Can individual actors, cyber criminal 
groups, foreign intelligence services, military units all be deterred using the same 
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strategy? A quick answer is no. Different strategies and applications would have to be 
applied to different actor targets. For example, how a government might deter a criminal 
group targeting its defense industrial base may be different than how it might deter an 
adversarial nation state, or even an allied one, from conducting espionage activity. For 
many large, well-networked nation states, the cyber threat actors targeting its assets are 
diverse. Suffice to say, individual actors and smaller, less capable groups (unless working 
on behalf of an adversarial nation state) are unlikely to be on the end of a retaliatory 
cyber attack for their activities. However, larger, more sophisticated cyber crime groups, 
hacktivists, and nation state actors are more primed for retaliation as they generally 
generate more publicity and cause the most damage. For deterrence by punishment to 
work effectively, the target needs to understand that the retaliatory action is a direct result 
of the offending action. If a target fails to understand the retaliation, it may be necessary 
to repeat the act using stronger, more obvious tactics. However, this runs the risk of 
misinterpretation by the target, and if the target has failed to understand the retaliatory 
nature of the cyber attack, it may see such an attack as an originating act. This could 
quickly escalate the situation into greater cyber conflict. 
 
• Success. In the case of cyber deterrence by punishment, there is the tactical objective of 
either stopping a cyber attack while it’s happening, punishing the offenders after it 
happened, or punishing the offenders prior to them launching an initial attack. In the case 
of punishing an offender during a cyber attack, the objective would be to get him to stop 
attacking; in the case of punishing an offender after attack, the objective would be to hurt 
him so he will not engage in similar activity in the future; and finally, in the case of a pre-
emptive strike, the objective would be to again hurt him enough so that he will be 
deterred from ever engaging in an attack. Tactically, these objectives all have merit, but 
how will they strategically be viable? In other words, would the battle be won at the 
expense of losing the war? For example, engaging in a pre-emptive or retaliatory cyber 
strike presupposes that you have successfully attributed, identified, and reconnoitered the 
target, presumably, in this case, the computer from which the adversary is operating. 
While the pre-emptive/retaliatory strike may destroy that computer, the adversary may 
have ten or fifty more computers from which to keep operating. In this example, can the 
defending nation believe that they really won the engagement? In another example, if the 
pre-emptive/retaliatory strike is directed at a different target (e.g., a power grid, a critical 
infrastructure, etc.), how does the victim state take proportionality into account, 
especially if the adversary has not even conducted an attack? Furthermore, how does the 
defending state know that the adversary will understand that the pre-emptive/retaliatory 
strike is in response to potential, ongoing, or future action, and that the message of 
deterrence will be received, and accepted? What is more, if the adversary is a nation state, 
how does one account for potential escalatory actions as a result of a perceived 
disproportionate retaliatory strike? Martin Libicki points out that: 
 
“attackers are likely to escalate if they (1) do not believe cyber retaliation is 
merited; (2) face internal pressures to respond in an obviously painful way; or (3) 
believe they will lose in a cyber tit-for-tat but can counter in domains where they 
enjoy superiority.”49  
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Conclusion 
In cyberspace, the effort to counter hostile acts through use of preemptive or retaliatory strikes 
may seem like a step in the right direction, especially when considering the failures suffered by 
network defenders to mitigate the threat of malicious activity. However, thousands of cyber 
attacks occur per day, suggesting great difficulty in distinguishing serious threats from minor 
ones.50 Stepping on an ant in your kitchen doesn’t prevent an infestation; similarly, cyber 
deterrence is not a panacea for threat actors seeking to exploit public and private sector networks. 
At present, there are too many unexplored variables and an undeveloped plan for its use to make 
this an effective course of action.  
 
Attribution challenges, the ability to respond quickly, effectively, and accurately, and the ability 
to create and sustain a model by which repeatability can be leveraged against different threat 
actors will continue to prove too insurmountable in the near term for victimized countries to 
launch pre-emptive or retaliatory cyber strikes. Cyber deterrence by denial has a better chance of 
succeeding; however, only in a limited capacity as network defenders have consistently been 
beaten by smarter, more agile adversaries obfuscating themselves in cyberspace. Instead of 
striking back against adversaries, organizations need to evaluate their current security postures to 
determine its effectiveness in the current cyber climate.  
 
Cyber security is not a static solution; as attackers gain more knowledge and experience, their 
tactics, techniques, and procedures will morph over time. Defense strategies that worked a year 
ago will likely not have the same success given the rate at which this landscape changes. 
According to the Department of Homeland Security’s U.S. Computer Emergency Response 
Team,  
 
“a comprehensive cyber security program leverages industry standards and best practices 
to protect systems and detect potential problems along with processes to be informed of 
current threats and enable timely response and recovery.”51  
 
Organizations need to implement adaptable security plans that take into account the dynamic 
aspects of cyberspace, and include milestones and performance measures to ensure that goals are 
met in a timely manner. Stricter security standards such as vulnerability patching and user 
awareness must be enacted in order to hold stakeholders accountable for compliance failure. The 
well respected SANS Institute, a leader in computer security training and certification, advocates 
the implementation of twenty security controls for cyber defense, and maintains that 
organizations successfully incorporating these controls have reduced their security risk.52 
Ultimately, due diligence with respect to cyber security is the deciding factor in combating 
hostile cyber activity. 
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